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Abstract 
Based on the relevance-theoretic distinction between explicit and implicit 
communication, and the notion of explicature of an utterance and its different types 
(Sperber and Wilson, 1986, 1995; Wilson and Sperber, 1993, 2002), this paper argues 
that (im)politeness may also be communicated explicitly, and not only implicitly as has 
been normally claimed in the extant literature. The fact that certain linguistic 
expressions and paralinguistic features have a procedural meaning that does not affect 
the truth-conditional content of the utterance where they occur but leads the hearer to 
obtain a propositional-attitude description can be exploited by the speaker in order to 
communicate her (im)polite attitude explicitly, as part of the explicit content of that 
utterance. The hearer will in turn rely on such expressions and features so as to recover 
a description of the speaker’s attitude and, hence, information about (im)politeness.  
 
Keywords: relevance theory, (im)politeness, implicatures, explicatures, lower/higher-
level explicatures, explicit/implicit communication. 
 
1. Introduction 
Relevance-theoretic research (Sperber and Wilson, 1986, 1995; Wilson and Sperber, 
2002) has shown that, when interpreting an utterance, the hearer has to develop its 
logical form into a full-fledged propositional form by means of pragmatic processes. 
The result of such processes is the derivation of the explicature of the utterance. Among 
the pragmatic processes involved in the derivation of the explicature of an utterance is 
the identification of the speech act that the speaker is performing and her attitude 
towards the propositional content of the utterance. In order to do so, the hearer may rely 
on certain linguistic expressions and paralinguistic features that have a procedural 
meaning that helps him obtain information about the speaker’s attitude. The attitudes 
that the speaker may intend to communicate can be very rich and varied, so it is 
reasonable to think that the hearer may infer information about the speaker’s 
(im)politeness at this point of the interpretive process. 
Traditionally, politeness has been assumed to be communicated implicitly as an 
implicature that the hearer has to recover when he realises that the speaker’s linguistic 
behaviour deviates from ‘efficient’ communication. However, according to Sperber and 
Wilson (1986, 1995) and Wilson and Sperber (1993, 2002), the recovery of the 
explicature of an utterance amounts to the recovery of its explicit content and, therefore, 
belongs to the explicit side of communication. For this reason, this paper will argue and 
illustrate from a relevance-theoretic viewpoint that hearers may make judgements about 
the (im)politeness of individuals or specific acts when recovering the explicatures of 
utterances. This would lead to reject the statement that politeness is only communicated 
as an implicature and admit that it can also be communicated explicitly, as part of the 
explicit content of utterances. 
 
2. Politeness implicated 
Since the publication of Grice’s (1969, 1975) and Searle’s (1969) works, politeness has 
been considered to be communicated implicitly in much of the extant literature. 
Accordingly, politeness is an implicature that the hearer has to recover in order to 
understand the reasons why the speaker communicates her messages in a manner that 
does not apparently meet the standards associated with ‘efficient’ communication 
captured by the Cooperative Principle and its four maxims of quantity, quality, relation 
and manner (Grice, 1969, 1975). Thus, Searle (1969) stated that the main reason why 
the speaker may select indirect speech acts may be her intention to be or seem polite. 
Similarly, Grice (1969, 1975) acknowledged that in those circumstances in which the 
speaker does not seem to abide by the Cooperative Principle and its maxims and 
conveys an implicit content her behaviour must be influenced by the operation of other 
conversational principles such as ‘be polite’. 
Leech (1983: 80) also admits that, even if the Cooperative Principle helps to explain in 
some cases the relation between sense and force of utterances, in other cases it in itself 
cannot explain why people are indirect and the relation between sense and force of non-
declarative types of utterances. That is the reason why he complemented the 
Cooperative Principle with his Politeness Principle and why Lakoff (1973, 1977) 
proposed her rules of politeness.  
Likewise, for Brown and Levinson (1978, 1987: 95) politeness is also the reason why 
speakers deviate from apparently efficient communication, and that deviation triggers 
an implicature: “Linguistic politeness is therefore implication in the classical way” but, 
more importantly, “[…] politeness has to be communicated and the absence of 
communicated politeness may, ceteris paribus, be taken as absence of the polite 
attitude” (Brown and Levinson, 1987: 5). These authors also claim that “Politeness is 
implicated by the semantic structure of the whole utterance (not sentence), not 
communicated by ‘markers’ or ‘mitigators’ in a simple signalling fashion which can be 
quantified” (Brown and Levinson, 1987: 22). According to Watts (1989: 136), 
politeness is then a conventionalised marked behaviour. 
The assumption that politeness is an implicature raises several questions, such as what 
is really communicated when the speaker wants to communicate her polite attitude, if 
that indeed constitutes a message, what the content of that message is, whether 
politeness is always communicated or it is only communicated in certain situations 
(Fraser, 2005: 67). In fact, it has been pointed out that politeness is taken for granted or 
anticipated and that it is the default norm for most communicative exchanges (e.g. 
Escandell Vidal, 1996; Fraser, 1990: 233, 2005: 66; Jary, 1998a, 1998b). This view of 
politeness coincides with what Watts (1989: 135) calls politic behaviour, a non-marked 
behaviour aimed at the establishment or maintenance of equilibrium in social relations. 
Consequently, it is only the breach of that default norm or politic behaviour that is noted 
and evaluated as impolite by interlocutors: “Competent adult members comment on the 
absence of politeness where it is expected, and its presence where it is not expected” 
(Kasper, 1990: 193). If this is true, “[…] then it is hard to see how the claim that the use 
of [politeness] forms/strategies always communicates politeness can be maintained” 
(Jary, 1998a: 2). 
In fact, Jary (1998a: 9) thinks that the (im)politeness of any utterance or behaviour is 
the result of the speaker’s intentionality and her reasons to use certain utterances or 
behave in a particular way. As regards the speaker’s intentionality, her assumptions 
about her social relationship with the hearer influence her own (linguistic) behaviour 
and this, in turn, evidences if such assumptions are compatible or incompatible with 
those of the hearer’s. If the speaker’s behaviour is compatible with the hearer’s 
assumptions, it is not relevant1 enough for the hearer to pay attention to it and, hence, 
will not be marked in terms of politeness. On the contrary, if the speaker’s (linguistic) 
behaviour is incompatible with the hearer’s assumptions, it will be relevant enough for 
the hearer to pay attention to it because it evidences that the speaker is being more 
(im)polite that expected2. Regarding the speaker’s reasons to use an utterance, her 
intention may be to communicate to the hearer that she is being more (im)polite than 
what he would have expected. However, the hearer will only interpret the speaker’s 
linguistic behaviour in that way if he recognises that it is sincere. If the hearer 
recognises that the speaker’s behaviour is insincere, he may attribute the speaker other 
intentions, such as that of flattering. In a similar way, the hearer will only conclude 
from a behaviour that differs from his expectations about (im)politeness that the speaker 
is impolite and has the intention of offending him if he can attribute to her that intention 
and recognises that she is being sincere to him. 
This paper will not question the validity of the statement that politeness is 
communicated implicitly, as it can in fact be communicated in this way in some 
circumstances. What it will argue from a relevance-theoretic standpoint (Sperber and 
Wilson, 1986, 1995; Wilson and Sperber, 2002) is that the hearer can also retrieve 
information about (im)politeness when pragmatically enriching the linguistic material 
obtained from the decoding of an utterance, i.e. when recovering its explicit content. 
This is so because the occurrence of certain linguistic expressions and some 
paralinguistic features may guide him to obtain a very specific description of the 
speaker’s attitude when interpreting an utterance. For this reason, the following section 
briefly summarises some of the claims about utterance interpretation made by this 
cognitive pragmatic model. 
 
3. Relevance theory and utterance interpretation 
Relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson, 1986, 1995; Wilson and Sperber, 2002) is based 
on a property of inputs to cognitive processes: their relevance. This property is defined 
in terms of positive cognitive effects – strengthening or contradiction of previously held 
information and contextual implication of assumptions from the interaction of new 
information with old information – and the cognitive or processing effort needed to 
achieve these effects. Ceteris paribus, the greater the positive cognitive effects achieved 
by processing an input in a context of available assumptions, and the smaller the 
processing effort required, the greater the relevance of such input to the individual 
processing it.  
Moreover, relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson, 1986, 1995; Wilson and Sperber, 
2002) also proposes two general principles: 
a) a Cognitive Principle of Relevance, according to which human cognition tends 
to be oriented to the maximisation of relevance; 
b) a Communicative Principle of Relevance, according to which ostensive stimuli 
generate a presumption of their own optimal relevance. 
Relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson, 1986, 1995; Wilson and Sperber, 2002) does not 
conceive communication as a mere encoding-decoding process, but as an ostensive-
inferential activity, in which inference intervenes not only in the recovery of utterance 
meaning, but also of speaker’s meaning. 
 
3.1.Understanding utterances 
Relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson, 1986, 1995; Wilson and Sperber, 2002) portrays 
utterance interpretation as a three-stage process in which decoding and inference work 
together. In order to process and understand an utterance, the first thing that the hearer 
has to do when hearing it is to decode it. The output of this process is a logical form, i.e. 
a set of structured concepts (Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 10). However, that logical form 
is not fully propositional because its truthfulness cannot be tested. Therefore, the hearer 
has to develop that logical form into a full-fledged propositional form by means of 
inferential processes in which he has to resort to contextual information. 
The development of a logical form into a fully propositional form requires that the 
hearer disambiguates the sentence uttered, since syntactic structures may correspond to 
different semantic representations, all of which are grammatically valid (e.g. Carston, 
1988, 1992, 1993; Wilson and Sperber, 1998; Blakemore and Carston, 1999). For 
example, when hearing an utterance such as (1) with two possible interpretations, the 
hearer has to decide whether it is the planes which are flying or the act of flying planes 
that can be dangerous:  
(1) Flying planes can be dangerous. 
Additionally, the hearer also has to assign reference to referential expressions, such as 
personal pronouns or proper names occurring in the utterance (e.g. Blakemore, 1992; 
Wilson and Sperber, 1993), and restrict the meaning of some lexical items. These 
primary pragmatic processes, known as saturation (e.g. Carston, 2001; Récanati, 2001), 
require that the hearer decides to which ‘John’ the speaker is referring in (2) and which 
‘house’ is being alluded to in (3), or what ‘coming soon’ in (2) exactly means – whether 
it means five, ten or more minutes, sooner than expected, sooner than usual etc. – and to 
what extent the house in (3) is ‘very expensive’ – whether it is very expensive for 
everybody, whether it is more expensive than other similar houses, whether it is very 
expensive for its location, etc.3: 
(2) John will come soon. 
(3) That house is very expensive. 
Finally, the hearer has to recover information about the speech act performed by the 
speaker and her attitude towards the propositional content communicated. This involves 
a further development of the propositional form of the utterance, since it must be 
embedded in an assumption schema that indicates to the hearer the speech act that the 
speaker is performing or her attitude towards that propositional content (Sperber and 
Wilson, 1995: 182; Wilson and Sperber, 1993: 5): 
(4) [The speaker thinks/says/believes/regrets/is happy that [X]] 
The result of these processes is the derivation of the explicature of the utterance, which 
is a combination of the information linguistically encoded in the utterance with 
contextual information that the hearer has to infer (Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 181). The 
more contextual information the hearer has to use in order to obtain the explicature of 
an utterance, the weaker that explicature is and, the other way around, the less 
contextual information the hearer has to use to obtain its explicature, the stronger its 
explicature is (Wilson and Sperber, 2002: 619). 
In the last stage of utterance interpretation the hearer will have to derive the 
implicatures of the utterance. These are assumptions that the hearer can deduce when 
combining the assumptions that an utterance makes manifest with other contextual 
information he may have access to. Implicatures are implicit contents and their recovery 
is a process that belongs to what Sperber and Wilson (1986, 1995) consider to be 
implicit communication. On the contrary, the explicature of an utterance constitutes its 
explicit content, so its recovery falls directly within what they term explicit 
communication. 
 
3.2.Lower- and higher-level explicatures 
The propositional form of an utterance constitutes its lower-level explicature. However, 
as mentioned above, that propositional form can be further embedded in an assumption 
schema that indicates to the hearer the speech act that the speaker is performing and her 
attitude towards the proposition that the utterance communicates. When the hearer 
embeds the propositional form of an utterance within an assumption schema, he obtains 
its higher-level explicature.  
For the hearer to obtain the higher-level explicature of an utterance, he can rely on some 
morphological marks, such as verbal mood, which provides him with a description of 
the speech act that the speaker is performing (5) (e.g. Jary, 2002; Sperber and Wilson, 
1995: 180; Wilson and Sperber, 1988); sentential adverbials, such as illocutionary (6), 
attitudinal (7) or evidential (8) adverbials (e.g. Ifantidou, 1992; Itani, 1990; Tanaka, 
1998); syntactic constituents, such as parenthetical or comment clauses (9) (e.g. 
Ifantidou, 1993; Itani, 1990), or discourse particles, such as ‘please’ (10) and hearsay 
particles, which show the speaker’s commitment to the content expressed (e.g. Blass, 
1989, 1990; Itani, 1990, 1998): 
(5) Give me a glass of water! 
(6) Seriously, I need a glass of water. 
(7) Unfortunately, I missed the train. 
(8) Clearly, Jane did not buy the paper. 
(9) Mary forgot the umbrella, I suppose. 
(10) Can you stop talking, please? 
These grammatical components of an utterance encode concepts that are not 
constituents of the proposition expressed by the utterance, but of its higher-level 
explicature. According to Wilson and Sperber (1993: 21), they are linguistic expressions 
that have a conceptual meaning that does not contribute to the truth-conditional content 
of the utterance where they occur, but constrain the hearer’s recovery of its higher-level 
explicature. Therefore, these linguistic expressions have a procedural4 meaning that 
facilitates the hearer’s comprehension of utterances by guiding him in the identification 
of the speech act that the speaker is performing or her attitude towards what she 
communicates, i.e. in understanding the speaker’s meaning. 
Moreover, in addition to those grammatical components, the hearer can also rely on 
certain suprasegmental or prosodic features of the utterance, such as intonation, lexical 
or sentence stress, which encode a procedural meaning that lead him to retrieve some 
type of syntactic, semantic or conceptual representation about the speaker’s attitude 
(Escandell Vidal, 1998; Fretheim, 1998; House, 1989; Imai, 1998; Narbona Reina, 
1997, 1999, 2000, 2001; Wilson and Wharton, 2005). Besides, the hearer can also rely 
on the occurrence of interjections, which also encode a procedural meaning that allows 
him to recover a speech-act or propositional-attitude description that is related to the 
expression of feelings of delight, surprise, regret, amusement, etc. (Wharton, 2003a). 
Likewise, facial expressions and gestures have a procedural meaning that enable the 
hearer to retrieve propositional-attitude descriptions similar to those he can retrieve 
from an interjection (Wharton, 2003b). These linguistic expressions and paralinguistic 
components of an utterance interact with contextual and discourse assumptions and thus 
contribute to the recovery of the speaker’s meaning. 
According to Grice (1975), the explicit content of an utterance was its semantic content 
and corresponded to ‘what is said’, so that any inferred information was an implicature 
and corresponded to ‘what is implied’. Nevertheless, as has been observed, the 
relevance-theoretic conception of utterance interpretation (Sperber and Wilson, 1986, 
1995; Wilson and Sperber, 2002) presents the recovery of speaker’s meaning as more 
liable to the intervention of inference, and implies a shift from the initial Gricean 
twofold distinction to a threefold process in which the hearer must recover (i) the 
semantic content of the utterance, which constitutes its logical form; (ii) what is said, 
which involves the inferential enrichment of that logical form in order to obtain its 
explicature, and (iii) what is communicated, which includes its implicatures (Récanati, 
1991)5. Furthermore, since the intervention of inference and the presence of some 
(para)linguistic material enable the hearer to retrieve a description of the speech act that 
the speaker is performing or of her attitude when recovering the explicature of an 
utterance, it is rather likely that he also infers information about (im)politeness when 
recovering the speaker’s meaning by relying on that type of material, as discussed in the 
next section. 
 
4. Politeness explicated 
When interpreting an utterance, the hearer can develop its higher-level explicature in 
different ways and with different degrees of complexity. Thus, from an utterance such 
as (11), the hearer may only recover a description of the speech act the speaker is 
performing (12), a representation of the speaker’s degree of conviction about its 
propositional content (13) or a description of the speaker’s attitude (14): 
(11) Peter is late. 
(12) Marya says that Peterx is latey at timet. 
(13) Marya firmly believes that Peterx is latey at timet. 
(14) Marya complains/regrets that Peterx is latey at timet. 
Higher-level explicatures are conceptual representations that indicate certain states of 
affairs and may contradict or imply other mental representations. Even if they have a 
truth-conditional content on their own, this content does not affect the truth-conditional 
content of their respective utterance (Wilson and Sperber, 1993: 22). 
As has been illustrated, the hearer can embed the fully propositional form of an 
utterance within an assumption schema describing the speaker’s attitude towards the 
proposition that she communicates. Hence, it is reasonable to think that the hearer is 
also able to develop the explicature of an utterance so as to infer the speaker’s 
(im)polite attitude when uttering it. In order to do so, he will have to carry out an 
inferential process in which he will have to combine assumptions of a different nature. 
Following the interpretive steps described by Sperber and Wilson (1986, 1995) and 
Wilson and Sperber (2002) in the previous section, in the case of an utterance such as 
(15), produced in a deference politeness system (Scollon and Scollon, 1983, 1995)6 
where neutral phatic utterances are normally expected (Laver, 1974, 1975, 1981), the 
hearer will decode it and obtain its logical form, which he will then enrich so as to 
recover its explicature (16). Once he has carried out these tasks, he will insert the 
explicature in an assumption schema, which will provide him with information about 
the speaker’s attitude (17). When doing so, he may access contextual information 
regarding the fact that in a politeness system like the one in which the speaker and he 
are interacting, neutral phatic utterances are normally expected from participants who 
do not know each other well or do not have an intimate relationship and, hence, are 
considered correct or appropriate in that sort of social relationship: 
(15) The bus seems to be delayed. 
(16) The busx seems to be delayed at timet with respect to timey. 
(17) a. The speaker has said that the busx seems to be delayed at timet with respect to 
timey. 
b. The speaker has said in a polite manner that the busx seems to be delayed at 
timet with respect to timey. 
For the hearer to embed the lower-level explicature of an utterance into a higher-level 
one describing the speaker’s (im)polite attitude, he will have to access different 
contextual sources (Yus Ramos, 1997-1998, 2000). Among them, his encyclopaedic or 
cultural information about aspects or expectations about interaction in specific 
politeness systems plays a crucial role. Similarly important are the speaker’s non-verbal 
behaviour, since her gestures and facial expression may help the hearer identify her 
attitude; the hearer’s biographical knowledge about the speaker, where he will find 
assumptions about her normal behaviour, her way of communicating specific attitudes, 
etc.; the hearer’s general knowledge about what can be polite in certain circumstances, 
or other linguistic cues, such as intonation, lexical or sentence stress or tone of voice.  
Concerning tone of voice, Brown and Levinson explained that, for instance, a creaky 
voice “[…] can implicate calmness and assurance and thence comfort and 
commiseration” (1987: 268) because of the low speech energy with which it is 
produced, while high pitch “[…] may implicate self-humbling and thus deference” 
(1987: 268) when used by an adult to another adult because of its natural association 
with the voice quality of children. However, following Wilson and Wharton’s (2005) 
proposal, these types of tone of voice can be said to encode a procedural meaning that 
would lead the hearer to recover the attitudes associated with them when obtaining the 
higher-level explicature of an utterance. 
Similarly, the placement of sentence stress upon particular elements of an utterance may 
contribute to the recovery of information about the speaker’s (im)polite attitude. Thus, 
in a compliment such as (18), the placement of sentence stress upon the adjective may 
guide the hearer to infer that the speaker is intensifying or exaggerating her interest, 
approval or sympathy with him (Brown and Levinson, 1987: 104-106) and, by doing so, 
she is addressing some of his positive face-wants and, hence, intends to be polite: 
(18) What a wónderful sweater! 
Likewise, gestures of prayer and supplication encode a procedural meaning that would 
permit the hearer to recover a description of the speaker’s attitude when processing the 
utterance such gestures accompany. 
The access and usage of these contextual sources may demand a greater level of 
inference from the hearer and, consequently, involve an increase in his cognitive effort, 
for he will have to expand his interpretive context so as to include the assumptions 
present in such sources. However, that increase of cognitive effort will be compensated 
by the recovery of a higher-level explicature containing a description of the speaker’s 
attitude or (im)politeness. 
In addition to tone of voice, prosody and gestures, there are other linguistic expressions 
which encode a procedural meaning that contributes to the recovery of higher-level 
explicatures and a conceptual meaning does not affect the truth-conditional content of 
the utterance where they occur. As mentioned above, relevance-theoretic research has 
shown that linguistic elements such as mood indicators, illocutionary, attitudinal or 
sentence adverbials, parenthetical or comment clauses and hearsay particles encode 
concepts that are not part of the proposition expressed by an utterance, but of its higher-
level explicature. Therefore, the speaker may also resort to some of these linguistic 
expressions in order to communicate politeness. 
In their complete classification of linguistic strategies that allow the speaker to perform 
face-threatening acts and communicate her intention to be polite, Brown and Levinson 
(1978, 1987) paid a special attention to hedges. These are linguistic expressions which 
mitigate and soften the propositional content of FTAs. These authors distinguished four 
types of hedges, three of which are linguistic: illocutionary force hedges, hedges 
addressed to the maxims of the Cooperative Principle and hedges addressed to 
politeness strategies. With this last type of hedges, the speaker signals that she is aware 
of the fact that she is threatening the hearer’s face, and suggests that what she says on 
the record might have been said off the record (Brown and Levinson, 1987: 171-172): 
(19) Frankly, I must leave now. 
Some of the hedges addressed to politeness strategies are attitudinal and illocutionary 
adverbials, and comment or parenthetical clauses. As already mentioned, Ifantidou 
(1992) and Itani (1990) have shown that such adverbials have a conceptual meaning that 
does not affect the truth-conditional content of the utterance where they occur, but 
contributes to the recovery of information about the speaker’s attitude. Likewise, 
Ifantidou (1993) has argued that parenthetical clauses encode concepts that are 
constituents of the higher-level explicature of an utterance. For this reason, it is 
reasonable to think that a speaker can resort to those linguistic expressions in order to 
communicate her intention to be polite towards the hearer and that the hearer in turn can 
use them to develop the higher-level explicature of the utterance where those 
expressions occur so as to recover a description of the speaker’s attitude or intention to 
avoid any possible face-threat. 
Accordingly, with an utterance such as (20) with the attitudinal adverb ‘honestly’, 
produced as a refusal to a previous invitation or offer to go to the cinema, the hearer 
could embed its lower-level explicature (21) within the higher-level explicature (22). 
But he could further enrich that higher-level explicature with contextual information 
about the speaker’s intention to avoid a possible face-threat (23): 
(20) Honestly, I must finish this paper. 
(21) Peterx must finish the papery at timet. 
(22) Peterx is telling me honestly that he must finish the papery at timet. 
(23) a. Peterx is telling me honestly because he wants to avoid any face loss that hex 
must finish the papery at timet. 
b. Peterx is telling me honestly because he wants to be polite that hex must finish 
the papery at timet. 
Similarly, when hearing (24) with a parenthetical clause, uttered as a critique of Susan’s 
late arrival, after recovering its lower-level explicature (25), the hearer could embed that 
lower-level explicature within a higher-level explicature (26). Then, he can further 
enrich its higher-level explicature with information about the speaker’s (im)polite 
attitude, which he will obtain from the different contextual sources he accesses (27): 
(24) Susan is a little bit late, I think. 
(25) John2 thinks that Susanx is latey at timet. 
(26) John2 says that he2 thinks that Susanx is latey at timet. 
(27) a. John2 says because he2 wants to be polite that he2 thinks that Susanx is latey at 
timet. 
b. John2 says because he2 wants to avoid any face loss that he2 thinks that Susanx 
is latey at timet. 
As has been seen, the occurrence of the (para)linguistic material discussed allows the 
speaker to communicate (im)politeness as part of her meaning, and not exclusively as an 
implicature that the hearer will recover as a result of the interaction of different 
contextual assumptions when he notes that the speaker’s linguistic behaviour deviates 
from specific standards attributed to ‘efficient’ communication. Hence, a hearer’s 
evaluation about the (im)politeness of another individual can be the output of the 
development of a logical form that he carries out so as to infer the speaker’s meaning. 
Accordingly, hearers may infer information about (im)politeness when recovering the 
higher-level explicatures of utterances, since it is at this stage of the interpretive process 
that they retrieve a description of the speaker’s attitude. Since the recovery of 
explicatures belongs to the explicit side of communication, it can be concluded that 
(im)politeness can be communicated explicitly. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper has argued that linguistic expressions, such as illocutionary, attitudinal or 
evidential adverbials, comment and parenthetical clauses, prosodic elements and 
paralinguistic material play a crucial role in verbal communication. They have a 
conceptual meaning that is not part of the truth-conditional content of utterances and a 
procedural meaning that contributes to the recovery of higher-level explicatures. 
Therefore, speakers can resort to them in order to communicate their intention to be 
polite or to avoid any possible face-threat. Hearers will in turn use them when 
developing the propositional form that they obtain after decoding and enriching the 
logical form of an utterance because such material constrains the description of the 
speaker’s attitude that he will recover. As a consequence, it can be concluded that 
hearers may infer information about (im)politeness when recovering the higher-level 
explicatures of utterances. Furthermore, since the explicature of an utterance is part of 
its explicit content, it can also be concluded that hearers may infer information about 
(im)politeness when obtaining the explicit content of utterances and, hence, that 
(im)politeness can also be communicated explicitly. 
 
Notes 
1. See section 3 for a definition of relevance. 
2. Jary (1998a: 9) illustrates his ideas in a diagram with five interpretive routes that the 
hearer may follow in order to recover information about the speaker’s 
(im)politeness. 
3. In relevance-theoretic terms, what the hearer has to do is to construct an ad hoc 
concept (e.g. Wilson, 2003). 
4. Conceptual meaning refers to mental representations, whereas procedural meaning 
alludes to mental instructions about how to process utterances or their constituents 
parts (e.g. Sperber and Wilson, 1986, 1995; Wilson and Sperber, 1993). Linguistic 
expressions typically having procedural meaning are discourse markers. 
5. In a similar manner, Bach (1994) distinguishes between what is said, the 
implicitures and the implicatures of an utterance. 
6. A deference politeness system is characterised as a social relation in which there is 
no power difference between speaker and hearer, but there is social distance 
between them. This is reflected in the formula [-P, +D]. 
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